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This article surveys developments relating to Oklahoma civil procedure
that have occurred during the past year.' The most conspicuous development
with respect to Oklahoma civil procedure was the Supreme Court's adoption of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules,2 which replace the previous Rules of the
Supreme Court,3 Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases,4 and Rules on
Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals.5 The prior Rules had not kept
up with amendments to the Oklahoma Statutes6 adopted in the past five years,
and the new set of Supreme Court Rules now conforms to the statutory law.
Aside from consolidating three sets of Rules into one and bringing the Rules
into line with the Oklahoma Statutes, the new Supreme Court Rules do not
make any substantial changes in Oklahoma appellate procedure. Thus, while
their adoption is certainly beneficial and probably necessary, the new Rules do
not represent an especially significant development.
Although less conspicuous than the adoption of the Supreme Court Rules,
there were a number of important and interesting decisions involving various
aspects of Oklahoma civil procedure that were issued by the Oklahoma appel-
late courts in the past year. Two decisions7 dealt with the imposition of mone-
tary sanctions against attorneys under section 2011 of title 12,' Oklahoma's
t Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. For previous articles in this series, see Charles W. Adams, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Law-
Civil Procedure, 31 TULSA LJ. 753 (1996); Charles W. Adams, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Law-
Civil Procedure, 30 TULSA I.J. 485 (1995).
2. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 1 (West 1997 Special Pamphlet).
3. OX.A. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 1 (Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2 (Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 3 (Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 990.2 to 995 (Supp. 1996).
7. See Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, No. 82183, 1996 WL 526743, at *4 (Okla.
Sept. 17, 1996) (holding sanctions inappropriate); Warner v. Hillcrest Medical Ctr., 914 P.2d 1060 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1995) (affirming award of sanctions for $100,000).
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (Supp. 1996).
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analog of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Several cases were
concerned with issues of trial procedure, such as the effect of a juror's false
responses to questions during voir dire,9 the trial court's discretion to allow
jurors to take notes, 0 and the trial court's giving jury instructions in writing,
rather than orally." In a line of cases, 2 the Oklahoma Supreme Court over-
ruled past precedent and held that a general release did not release tortfeasors
who were not specifically named in it. In addition, in two somewhat confusing
cases, 3 both of which were limited to prospective application, the Supreme
Court noted the absence of an effective provision for the giving of notice of the
date of filing of a judgment.
.lso of some significance were a number of statutory changes relating to
discovery procedure. These include a "meet and confer" requirement before a
party may seek a protective order 4 or move to compel discovery," a provi-
sion allowing attorneys to issue subpoenas on behalf of any Oklahoma state
court,'6 an amendment concerning the making of objections and the giving of
instructions not to answer questions at depositions, 7 and an amendment con-
cerning objections to interrogatories.
These and other developments affecting Oklahoma civil procedure are
discussed below. Part I deals with pretrial procedure, and it includes discus-
sions of recent Oklahoma cases involving statutes of limitation, pleading, juris-
diction, and joinder of parties, as well as a review of the 1996 amendments to
the Oklahoma Discovery Code. Part I covers trial procedure, arbitrations,
judgments and settlements. Finally, Part IV deals with appellate procedure,
including the adoption of the new Supreme Court Rules.
II. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
The importance of statutes of limitation in Oklahoma civil litigation is
reflected in the number of appellate cases that deal with them each year. Sever-
al cases 9 were concerned with the limitation periods in the Oklahoma Govern-
9. See, e.g., Dominion Bank v. Masterson, 928 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1996) (reversing and remanding for
new trial).
10. See, e.g., Sligar v. Bartlett, 916 P.2d 1383 (Okla. 1996) (allowing trial court discretion).
11. See, e.g., Pine Island RV Resort, Inc. v. Resort Management, Inc., 922 P.2d 609 (Okla. 1996) (find-
ing no fundamental error).
12. See Hoyt v. Paul R. Miller, M.D., Inc., 921 P.2d 350 (Okla. 1996); Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp.,
920 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1996); Shadden v. Valley View Hosp., 915 P.2d 364 (Okla. 1996); Carmichael v. Belier,
914 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1996); Cotner v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 903 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1995); Moss v. City of
Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995).
13. See Joiner v. Brown, 925 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1996); Bushert v. Hughes, 912 P.2d 334 (Okla. 1996).
14. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3226(C)(1) (Supp. 1996).
15. See id. § 3227(A)(2).
16. See id. § 2004.1(A)(3).
17. See id. § 3230(E)(1).
18. See id. § 3233(A).
19. See Calvert v. Tulsa Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 932 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 1996); Shanbour v.
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mental Tort Claims Act.' Other cases dealt with Oklahoma's ten year statute
of repose' and with the accrual' and tolling' of statutes of limitation.
There were also noteworthy appellate decisions concerned with the Okla-
homa Pleading24 and Discovery' Codes. These included cases dealing with
the use of qualified general appearances, the limited subject matter jurisdiction
of probate courts,' monetary sanctions against attorneys, and the procedure
for substitution of the successor to a defendant who dies during the course of
litigation."
A. Statutes of Limitation
After the Oklahoma Supreme Court abrogated the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity,29 the Oklahoma Legislature adopted the Governmental
Tort Claims Act," in which it simultaneously adopted and partially waived
sovereign immunity. An important aspect of the partial waiver of sovereign
immunity was placing strict limits on the time for the presentation of claims to
state governmental entities and the commencement of actions against state gov-
ernmental entities after claims have been denied. Section 156(B) of title 51
requires a claim to be presented within one year after the loss occurs,3 and
section 157(B) of title 51 bars a claim if an action against a governmental entity
is not commenced within 180 days after denial of the claim by the governmen-
tal entity.3"
In Shanbour v. Hollingsworth,33 the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed
whether the 180 day limitation period in section 157(B) could be extended for
excusable neglect under section 2006(B) of title 12, which gives trial courts the
authority to extend various time periods even after they have expired.34 The
Supreme Court determined that the 180 day period for commencing an action
was not subject to section 2006(B), because the trial court's authority under
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 157 (1991).
21. See O'Dell v. Lamb-Grays Harbor Co., 911 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (holding that statute
applied to products liability claim involving a fixture); Lincoin Bank & Trust Co. v. Neustadt, 917 P.2d 1005
(Okla. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that statute applied to other tort actions in addition to negligence).
22. See Gallagher v. Enid Regional Hosp., 910 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1995) (holding that start of limitation
period was a fact question for the jury).
23. See Freeman v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 73 F.3d 279 (10th Cir. 1996) (tolling on account of dis-
ability); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Greer, 911 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1995) (applying adverse domination doctrine).
24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2001-2025 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
25. Id. §§ 3226-3237.
26. See Estes v. Estes, 921 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1996); In re Estate of Steen, 909 P.2d 63 (Okia. Ct. App.
1992).
27. See Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, No. 82183, 1996 WL 526743, at *1 (Okla.
Sept. 17, 1996) (holding sanctions inappropriate); Warner v. Hillcrest Medical Ctr., 914 P.2d 1060 (Okla. Ct
App. 1995) (affirming award of sanctions for $100,000).
28. See Comog v. Mashburn, 901 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1995).
29. See Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983).
30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-172 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
31. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 156(B) (Supp. 1996).
32. See id. § 157(B).
33. 918 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1996).
34. See OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 2006 (Supp. 1996).
1997]
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section 2006(B) to extend time depended on the timely commencement of an
action. 5 The limitation period in the Tort Claims Act is similar to other statutes
of limitation in this way.
Tyler v. Board of County Commissioners36 is another case that was con-
cerned with the 180 day time limit in section 157(B). The plaintiff was a minor
whose parent filed the action on her behalf outside the 180 time limit. 7 She
argued that the time for filing was tolled during her infancy under section 96 of
title 12,38 which provides for the tolling of a statute of limitation on account of
a legal disability, including infancy. Following the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision in Johns v. Wynnewood School Board of Education,39 the Court of
Appeals decided that the 180 day period in section 157(B) was not tolled by
section 96.0 It distinguished Cruse v. Atoka County Board of County Commis-
sioners,4 in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that Oklahoma's sav-
ings statute42 permitted the refiling of a timely filed governmental tort claims
action, on the ground that the trial court's power to toll the 180 day time limit
was not invoked until the action was timely filed.43 The court's distinction of
Cruse is not convincing, however, because section 96 generally operates to toll
other limitation periods before the filing of an action;' otherwise, it would be
totally ineffectual. Thus, the Court of Appeals should have decided the 180 day
period in section 157(B) was tolled by section 96.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed another issue involving the Gov-
ernmental Tort Claims Act in Calvert v. Tulsa Public Schools, Independent
School District No. Ls The parents of a deceased child presented a claim and
brought suit against a governmental entity before they had been appointed as
personal representatives of her estate.' After they were appointed, the parents
sought to amend their petition to reflect their status as personal representatives
of their child's estate, but the trial court granted summary judgment against
them on the ground that they had not been appointed until the 180 time limit in
section 157(B) had run.47 The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the parents were proper claimants under section 152(4) of title 51" because
they were performing the functions of a personal representative before their
appointment.' The Supreme Court also allowed the parents to amend their
petition after they were appointed as personal representatives, even though the
35. See Shanbour, 918 P.2d at 75.
36. 915 P.2d 951 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
37. See id. at 951.
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 96 (1991).
39. 656 P.2d 248 (Okla. 1982).
40. See Tyler, 915 P.2d at 952.
41. 910 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1995).
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).
43. See Tyler, 915 P.2d at 952.
44. See Hamilton v. Vaden, 721 P.2d 412, 416 (Okla. 1986).
45. Calvert v. Tulsa Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 932 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 1996).
46. See id. at 1088.
47. See id.
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152(4) (1991).
49. See Calvert, 932 P.2d at 1089.
[Vol. 32:755
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180 day limitation period had expired before the filing of their motion to
amend.0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided an im-
portant issue concerning the tolling of statutes of limitation under Oklahoma
law in Freeman v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc.5 The suit was brought under the
Oklahoma Securities Act by the guardian of the estate of a mentally incompe-
tent person. 2 The trial court dismissed on statute of limitation grounds, but the
Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that the statute of limitation was tolled under
section 96 of title 12," until one year after the removal of the plaintiff's legal
disability.54 The court held that the tolling provision applied even though the
person subject to the legal disability had a guardian who could have brought the
action within the limitation period.55
Oklahoma's savings statute56 and the federal savings statute57 were the
twin subjects of Pointer v. Western Heights Independent School District.58 The
Oklahoma savings statute gives a plaintiff one year from the dismissal of a
timely filed action, other than on its merits, in which to refile the case without
being barred by a statute of limitation that may have run before the refiling.59
Likewise, the federal savings statute tolls a statute of limitation for thirty days
after a state law claim is dismissed from a federal court action, where the state
law claim was asserted under the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction.'
The plaintiff in Pointer filed a governmental tort claims action in an Oklahoma
state court, and after dismissing it voluntarily after the 180 day time limit in
section 157(B) had expired, refiled the governmental tort claim as a supplemen-
tal claim to a federal civil rights claim in federal court.6 The federal court
dismissed the governmental tort claim without prejudice after it dismissed the
federal claim with prejudice, and the plaintiff then refiled the governmental tort
claim in an Oklahoma state court for a second time.62 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court ruled that neither the Oklahoma nor the federal savings statutes saved the
governmental tort claim from section 157(B).63 Following prior authority,'
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma savings statute permitted
only one refiling after the statute of limitation had run; thus, it could not save
the second state court filing.' The Supreme Court also held that the federal
50. See id. at 1090.
51. 73 F.3d 279 (10th Cir. 1996).
52. See id. at 280.
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 96 (1991).
54. See Freeman, 73 F.3d at 281.
55. See id. at 283.
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1994).
58. 919 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1996).
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1996).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
61. See Pointer, 919 P.2d at 5-6.
62. See id. at 6.
63. See id.
64. See Grider v. USX Corp., 847 P.2d 779, 782 (Okla. 1993).
65. See Pointer, 919 P.2d at 7.
19971
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savings statute could only save a claim that was filed within the original statute
of limitation, rather than within the additional time allowed by the Oklahoma
savings statute.'
Medlin v. Texaco, Inc.7 was another recent case concerned with
Oklahoma's savings statute. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed a claim against
one of several defendants in the case, and then after discovering new informa-
tion that implicated the dismissed defendant, sought leave of court to add the
defendant back in the original case after the governing statute of limitation had
expired.' The Oklahoma Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs were not
required to commence a separate action against the dismissed defendant and
then move to have the new action consolidated with the original action.69 In-
stead, the plaintiffs would be permitted to obtain leave of court to directly add
the dismissed defendant to the original action.70
Two recent cases applied Oklahoma's ten year statute of repose in section
109 of title 12.!' Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Neustadi' was an action
against a neighboring landowner seeking damages arising from the defendant's
failure to build a proper retaining wall when the defendant built an office build-
ing and parking garage next to the plaintiff's property in 1977. Since the action
was not filed until 1994, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals ruled that it was
barred by section 109.' The Court of Appeals determined that even though the
action was not based on negligence, it was a tort action to recover damages for
the construction of an improvement on real property and therefore it came
under section 109.!' In O'Dell v. Lamb-Grays Harbor Co.,75 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ruled that section 109
barred a products liability claim against the manufacturer of a slat conveyor at a
paper mill.76 The court reasoned that the machine was an improvement to real
property because it was built into the floor of the paper mill, and therefore, it
was permanently attached to the paper mil.77
The jury's role in determining the date when a statute of limitation begins
to run was the subject of Gallagher v. Enid Regional Hospital.78 After attempt-
ing suicide, the plaintiff was treated at a hospital on two occasions in May,
1991. 7' In October, 1991, the plaintiff's psychiatrist informed his lawyer that
the plaintiff had not received appropriate treatment at the hospital, and then in
66. See id.
67. 926 P.2d 804 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
68. See id. at 806.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 807.
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 109 (1991).
72. 917 P.2d 1005 (Okla. CL App. 1996).
73. See id. at 1008.
74. See id.
75. 911 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
76. See id. at 494.
77. See id. at 493-94.
78. 910 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1995).
79. See id. at 985.
[Vol. 32:755
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September, 1993, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the
hospital and two physicians." The trial court dismissed the action because it
was barred by the two year statute of limitation in section 18 of title 76,"1 but
the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the limitation period did not begin
to run until the plaintiff's lawyer advised the plaintiff in October, 1991, that he
did not receive appropriate treatment at the hospital. 2 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court decided that the date when the statute of limitation began to run should
not have been decided by the Court of Appeals, because it was a fact question
for the jury. 3 It therefore vacated the Court of Appeals opinion and remanded
the case to the trial court with instructions to submit to the jury the issue of
when the plaintiff should have known, through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, of his potential malpractice claim."
The Oklahoma appellate courts addressed a number of issues involving
other aspects of pretrial procedure besides statutes of limitation during the past
year. They included pleading," jurisdiction, 6  sanctions, 7  and the
intervention"8 and substitution 9 of parties. These topics are discussed below.
B. Pleading, Jurisdiction, and Joinder of Parties
Section 2012(A) of title 12 allows a defendant to obtain a twenty day
extension of time to respond to a petition if the defendant files an appearance
within twenty days of service of the summons and petition."° Section 2012(A)
also provides that the filing of an appearance waives a number of defenses,
including lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of
service of process.9' The Oklahoma Court of Appeals applied this waiver pro-
vision in First Texas Savings Ass'n v. Bernsen,2 where it held that several
defendants waived the defense of personal jurisdiction by filing an appearance
under section 2012(A).93 The Court of Appeals added in dictum, however, that
if the defendants had wished to preserve this defense, they could have done so
by filing a qualified appearance.94 It relied on the decision in Young v.
Walton95 in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the waiver pro-
80. See id.
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 18 (1991).
82. See Gallagher, 910 P.2d at 985.
83. See id. at 986.
84. See id.
85. See First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Bernsen, 921 P.2d 1293 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
86. See Estes v. Estes, 921 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1996); In re Estate of Steen, 909 P.2d 63 (Okla. CL App.
1992).
87. See Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, No. 82183, 1996 WL 526743, at *1 (Okla.
Sept. 17, 1996); Warner v. Hillcrest Medical Ctr., 914 P.2d 1060 (Okla. C. App. 1995).
88. See Landrum v. National Union Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 324 (Okla. 1996).
89. See Comog v. Mashburn, 901 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1995).
90. See OKaA. STAT. it. 12, § 2012(A) (1991).
91. See id.
92. 921 P.2d 1293 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
93. See id. at 1296.
94. See id.
95. 807 P.2d 248, 249 (Okla. 1991).
1997]
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vision in section 2012(A) did not apply to a qualified or a special appearance.
Unfortunately, the First Texas dictum and the Young decision are problematic,
because they are inconsistent with federal authority" interpreting Rule 12(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on which the Oklahoma statute was
based.
Estes v. Estes9' and In re Estate of Steen98 dealt with the special limited
subject matter jurisdiction of district courts in probate cases. In In re Estate of
Steen, the Court of Appeals held that the district court handling the probate of
an estate lacked jurisdiction to determine title to property belonging to one of
the heirs that was not part of the estate." The Steen decision was approved for
publication by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, and then followed in Estes v.
Estes," in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a district court sit-
ting in non-probate proceedings had jurisdiction to determine title to personal
property in the possession of one of the heirs of an estate that was also claimed
by the estate.'' The Probate Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association has
proposed legislation that would overturn the result in the Steen case and permit
a district court to determine title to property in connection with the probate of
an estate,"° but the Legislature has not adopted the Committee's proposals as
yet.
In In re Estate of Wheeler,"e3 the specialized nature of probate courts was
also emphasized. There the Court of Appeals ruled that the Oklahoma Pleading
Code did not apply to a probate proceeding, because a probate proceeding is a
special proceeding in rem that is controlled by the probate code."°
Two decisions by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Beshara v. Southern
National Bank"5 and Washington v. State ex rel. Department of Correc-
tions," were concerned with the procedure in section 2012(B) of title 12"7
for treating a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment when mate-
rials outside the pleadings are attached to the motion. The statute provides that
the trial court must allow the party against whom such a motion is filed a rea-
sonable opportunity to respond.' Because the trial courts in the Beshara and
96. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Marine, Inc., 829 F.2d 1399, 1402 (7th Cir. 1987) ('IT]he gener-
al rule in civil actions is now (and has been for some time) that any appearance in an action is a general
appearance."); SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12
abolished the distinction between general and special appearances when the Federal Rules were adopted in
1938.").
97. 921 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1996).
98. 909 P.2d 63 (Okla. CL App. 1992).
99. See id. at 65.
100. 921 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1996).
101. See id. at 348.
102. See OBA Resolutions for 1997 OBA Legislative Program, 67 OKLA. BJ. 3107, 3114 (1996). See also
Marvin C. Emerson, Legislative Report, 68 OKLA. BJ. 381, 381 (1997).
103. 919 P.2d 460 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
104. See id. at 462.
105. 928 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1996).
106. 915 P.2d 359 (Okla. 1996).
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Washington cases granted the motions without giving a reasonable opportunity
for the opposing party to respond, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded in
both cases."°
Monetary sanctions were imposed on attorneys by the trial courts in
Warner v. Hillcrest Medical Center"1 and Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hospital
Founders Ass'n.'" The award of sanctions was affirmed by the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals in the Warner case,"' but reversed by the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court in the Hammonds case."'
In the Warner case, the trial court imposed sanctions on an attorney for
improperly naming a number of defendants in a lawsuit without any basis in
law or fact, and for failing to dismiss them from the case after he failed to
develop a viable cause of action against them."' The Court of Appeals af-
finned the award of sanctions in favor of some of the defendants, but it re-
versed as to others."' The Court of Appeals found that, as to the first group
of defendants, the attorney violated section 2011 of title 126 by making alle-
gations against them that had no basis in fact, and keeping them in the case
after it was apparent that there was no basis in law or fact for them being
there." '7 With respect to the other defendants, the Court of Appeals found that
the attorney's theory of liability was not frivolous even though their demurrer
to the evidence was properly sustained on the ground that there was not suffi-
cient objective evidence in the record to support a claim against them."' The
Court of Appeals noted that section 2011 countenances the filing of actions that
are warranted by a good faith argument for the modification of existing law,
and it cautioned that sanctions should not be used to chill new theories of re-
covery that may become law in the future."9
In the Hammonds case, the attorneys for the plaintiffs moved for sanctions
against the defendants in the form of an order striking their answers." They
alleged that the defendants had improperly modified medical records that had
been produced in the case, and the defendants retaliated by seeking monetary
sanctions against the plaintiff's attorneys.' After a three day hearing, the trial
court denied the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, and instead, it sanctioned the
plaintiff's attorneys for seeking sanctions against the defendants." In revers-
109. See Beshara, 928 P.2d at 282; Washington, 915 P.2d at 363.
110. 914 P.2d 1060 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
111. Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, No. 82183, 1996 WL 526743, at *1 (Okla. Sept.
17, 1996).
112. See Warner, 914 P.2d at 1072.
113. See Hammonds, 1996 WL 526743, at *4.
114. See Warner, 914 P.2d at 1068.
115. See id. at 1072-73.
116. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (1991).
117. See Warner, 914 P.2d at 1067-68.
118. See id. at 1070.
119. See id. at 1069-70.
120. See Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, No. 82183, 1996 WL 526743, at *4 (Okla.
Sept. 17, 1996).
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ing the sanctions order, the Oklahoma Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized
that the plaintiffs attorneys had been brought into the case only a month before
trial, and there were in fact three different versions of the plaintiff's medical
records." The Supreme Court concluded that the filing of the motion for
sanctions by the plaintiffs' attorneys was not unreasonable as a means for them
to attempt to ascertain which version of the medical records was correct. 4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court limited an intervening party's opportunity
to participate in a jury trial in Landrum v. National Union Insurance Co." A
workers' compensation carrier was allowed to intervene in a personal injury
action as of right under section 2024(A) of title 12," because it had paid
workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff and was entitled to subrogation
under Oklahoma law."V The plaintiff had no objection to the insurer's motion
to intervene, but she did object to its participation in the jury trial" due to
the potential for prejudice that could arise from informing the jury of the com-
pensation claim. 9 The trial court refused to let the insurer participate actively
in the jury trial, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed. 3" It held that the
trial court had discretion under section 2018 of title 12"' to sever the
insurer's claim for trial. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion,
because the insurer had no right to a jury trial (its claim was equitable), and
also because the insurer made no claim that it had been prejudiced by the trial
court's decision."'
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals discussed the Oklahoma class action
statute"3 in an unusual context in House of Sight & Sound, Inc. v. Faulk-
ner.' The plaintiff sought an injunction and damages for false and malicious
advertising against six attorneys who had filed a separate class action suit
against it." The basis of the plaintiff's action was that the attorneys had pub-
lished two notices addressed to the plaintiff's customers informing them that a
class action had been filed against the plaintiff and that they might be entitled
to money damages. 37 The plaintiff claimed that the notice was false, because
the class action suit had not yet been certified as a class action.' The Court
of Appeals found, however, that the notice was not false, because it did not
123. See id.
124. See id. at *3.
125. 912 P.2d 324 (Okla. 1996).
126. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2024(A) (1991).
127. See Landrum, 912 P.2d at 328-29.
128. The insurer's reason for wanting to participate in the trial appeared to have been to avoid having to
pay an attorney fee to the plaintiff's attorney. See id. at 328.
129. See id. at 326.
130. See id. at 330.
131. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2018(D) (1991).
132. See Landrum, 912 P.2d at 329.
133. See id. at 328.
134. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023 (1991).
135. 912 P.2d 357 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
136. See id. at 358.
137. See id. at 359.
138. See id. at 360.
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claim that the class had been certified.39 The court also stated that if the
plaintiff wanted to restrict the giving of notice to members of the class, the
plaintiff should have sought an order in the class action under section
2023(C)(2) and (D) of title 12,'" instead of filing a separate lawsuit.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Cornog v. Mashburn42 un-
derscores the need for lawyers to be aware of the procedure for substitution of
parties under section 2025 of title 12."43 Following the defendant's death, his
counsel filed a suggestion of death in the case.'" When the plaintiff failed to
substitute the proper party within ninety days as required by section 2025, the
defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court granted the mo-
tion. 45 The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the suggestion of
death would not have been valid if a personal representative for the defendant's
estate had not been appointed at the time of its filing." It therefore remanded
with directions to the trial court to determine whether a personal representative
had been appointed when the suggestion of death was filed. 47
In addition to these case law developments relating to pretrial procedure,
there were a number of amendments to the Oklahoma Discovery Code that
went into effect on November 1, 1996. These are reviewed below.
C. Discovery
An amendment to section 2004.1 of title 12 facilitates the taking of deposi-
tions of nonparty witnesses and the subpoenaing of witnesses, especially for
cases pending in counties other than where the attorney's office is located."
The amendment authorizes attorneys to issue and sign subpoenas from any
Oklahoma state court as an officer of the court.49 Thus, an attorney may now
issue a subpoena without having to obtain a blank subpoena form from the
particular court from which the subpoena is issued. This amendment was based
on a 1991 amendment to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Several amendments to section 3226 of title 1250 were based on some of
the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sec-
tion 3226CB)(4) of title 12 was amended to require a party who asserts an ob-
jection to discovery on privilege grounds to provide a "privilege log" that de-
scribes the nature of the documents or communications that are not being dis-
139. See id. at 361.
140. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(C)(2), (D) (1991).
141. See Faulkner, 912 P.2d at 362.
142. 901 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1995).
143. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2025 (1991).
144. See Cornog, 901 P.2d at 825.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 826.
147. See id.
148. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004.1 (Supp. 1996).
149. See id.
150. Id. § 3226.
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closed.'5' The description must not reveal privileged information, but it should
be sufficient to enable the discovering party to assess whether a privilege is
applicable.'52
A number of revisions were made in the duty to supplement discovery
responses in section 3226(E) of title 12." 3 Section 3226(E) imposes a duty on
a party to supplement a response to a discovery request in certain circumstances
when the party obtains additional information. 5' The duty to supplement aris-
es with respect to questions addressed to the identity and location of witnesses,
including expert witnesses, or when the responding party obtains information
that a prior response to discovery either was incorrect when made, or is no
longer true. 55 The 1996 amendments to section 3226(E) limit the duty to sup-
plement to responses to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for
admission; as a result, a party no longer has a duty to supplement responses to
questions at depositions.'56 There has also been a materiality requirement add-
ed so that newly obtained information must be material in order for the duty to
supplement to arise. 7 Finally, there is an exception to the duty to supplement
if the other parties have obtained the information by other means.'58
The 1996 amendments to section 3226 do not include the mandatory dis-
closure provisions in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'59 The
federal mandatory disclosure provisions have been the subject of some contro-
versy for a number of reasons," including that it is not consistent with the
adversary system, '  and it increases the cost of litigation." As a conse-
quence, a number of federal courts have opted out of mandatory disclosure, 63
and the Oklahoma state courts are probably better off without it.
An amendment to section 3229 of title 12'6' permits greater flexibility in
the conduct of discovery. It authorizes parties to stipulate to extensions of the
151. See id. § 3226(B)(4).
152. For federal cases requiring the use of such a privilege log, see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974
F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting out information to be included in a privilege log); Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Taylor v. Florida Atl. Univ., 132 F.R.D. 304, 306 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("The
privilege list must clearly identify the individually privileged documents, the privilege claimed, the date of the
communication, the source of the information, the identity of the person to whom the communication was
made, the nature and general content of the document, and the parties to whom each document was dissemi-
nated.").
153. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3226(E) (Supp. 1996).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. § 3226(E)(2).
157. See id. § 3226(E)(2)(a).
158. See id. § 3226(E)(2)(b).
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
160. See, e.g., Litigators Reject Disclosure Rule, INSIDE LITIG., May 1996, at 5.
161. See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) - "Much
Ado About Nothing?", 46 HASTINGS LJ. 679, 760-92 (1995).
162. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure,
73 Tx. L. REV. 753, 785-86 (1995).
163. See, e.g., U.S. D. Cr. R. 26.3 (E.D. Okla.); U.S. D. Cr. R. 26.3 (N.D. Okla.). Surveys have shown
that over half of the federal judicial districts have opted out of the mandatory disclosure requirements. See
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 162, at 756 n.15.
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3229 (Supp. 1996).
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time for responses to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for
admission without having to obtain leave of court, so long as the extensions do
not interfere with any discovery deadlines set by the court."
Several amendments to section 3230 of title 12'" are generally based on
the 1993 amendments to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. An
amendment to section 3230(E) requires objections to questions at depositions to
be made in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner.67 This amend-
ment was evidently intended to curtail the "coaching" of deposition witnesses
through spurious objections and other comments by counsel (such as the phrase
"If you know" to signal that the witness should claim lack of knowledge in
response to a deposition question). Another amendment to section 3230(E) pro-
hibits instructions not to answer questions at depositions, except where the
information sought is not discoverable by law, or when necessary to assert a
privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to seek
an order terminating the deposition." Prior to the amendments to section
3230(F) of title 12,169 a witness was required to review and sign the depo-
sition transcript after a deposition, unless the review and signing were waived
by the parties or the witness was unavailable. Under the amended version, a
witness must be afforded an opportunity to review and sign the deposition
transcript, but is not required to do so.7
Two amendments to the Oklahoma Discovery Code dealt with videotape
depositions. Section 3230(G) of title 12 now requires a party who takes a
deposition and records it on videotape to furnish a free copy of the videotape,
in addition to a copy of the transcript, to the witness upon request.' The oth-
er amendment was to section 3232, which now requires a party who introduces
a videotape deposition to also provide the court with a transcript, unless the
trial court directs otherwise." A transcript would be needed if the case was
later appealed.
The amendments that were made to section 3233 of title 12 were con-
cemed with objections to interrogatories." One of the amendments requires a
party who objects to an interrogatory to state the grounds of objection "with
specificity" and to answer "to the extent [that] the interrogatory is not objec-
tionable."' 4 Another provides for waiver of grounds for objection that are not
timely asserted. 75
165. See id.
166. Id. § 3230.
167. See id. § 3230(E).
168. See id.
169. Id. § 3230(F).
170. See id.
171. See id. § 3232(C).
172. See id. § 3232(C).
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Amendments to section 3226(C) and 3237(A)(2) of title 12 have imposed
"meet and confer" requirements on motions for protective orders and to compel
discovery.176 The amendment to section 3226(C) requires a party seeking a
protective order to "meet and confer" with other parties first in an attempt to
resolve their dispute without a court order, and the amendment to section
3237(A) added a similar requirement for motions to compel discovery."r Both
"meet and confer" requirements may be satisfied either by telephone or a face
to face conference. 7
In addition to these statutory amendments to the Oklahoma Discovery
Code, there was a brief but significant order relating to discovery issued by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in McCullough v. Mathews."9 The Supreme Court
ordered that a plaintiff's attorney should be allowed to be present as a represen-
tative at the medical examination of the plaintiff under section 3235 of title
12." It also ruled that the representative's role was passive and limited to
that of an observer, and that audio recording of the examination should be
allowed as well the taking of handwritten notes by the representative. 8'
The Oklahoma appellate courts handed down a number of decisions con-
cerning various issues of trial procedure, settlement, and judgments during the
past year. In one case, a jury verdict was reversed because of a juror's false
answers during voir dire." Note taking by jurors" and the use of written,
rather than oral, jury instructions' were the subjects of two other opinions.
There was also a significant decision dealing with arbitration." These devel-
opments are examined below.
I. TRIAL PROCEDURE, SETTLEMENT, AND JUDGMENTS
A. Trial Procedure and Arbitration
Dominion Bank of Middle Tennessee v. Masterson" involved miscon-
duct by a juror during voir dire. The juror stated in response to a question by
the plaintiffs counsel that he had been a party to one lawsuit, when in fact he
had been a party to twenty one lawsuits, including one in which the defendant's
counsel had obtained a judgment against that juror." 7 The juror was later
elected foreman, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.'88 The Okla-
176. See id. §§ 3226(C), 3237(A)(2).
177. See id. § 3237(A).
178. See id. §§ 3226(C), 3237(A)(2).
179. 918 P.2d 25 (Okla. 1995).
180. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3235 (1991).
181. See McCullough, 918 P.2d at 25.
182. See Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn. v. Masterson, 928 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1996).
183. See Sligar v. Bartlett, 916 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Okla. 1996).
184. See Pine Island RV Resort, Inc. v. Resort Management, Inc., 922 P.2d 609, 611 (Okla. 1996).
185. See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996).
186. 928 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1996).
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homa Supreme Court held that the defendant did not have to prove that the ver-
dict was unjust or the product of prejudice or bias in order to receive a new tri-
al. 89 Regardless of whether the juror's failure to disclose the information con-
cerning the other lawsuits was intentional or accidental, the defendant was
entitled to a new trial, because the juror's false response deprived the defendant
of the opportunity to delve deeper into the juror's qualifications."9°
The Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed note taking by jurors in Sligar v.
Bartlett.9' When the plaintiff's counsel informed her that one of the jurors
was taking notes during the opening statements, the trial judge assured both
parties that the notes would be confiscated before deliberations."9 Neither
counsel reminded the judge to confiscate the notes at the end of the trial, how-
ever, and she failed to do so.'93 Because the jury relied on the notes in reach-
ing its verdict, and because the judge had promised that she would confiscate
the notes before deliberations, she granted the plaintiff's motion for new tri-
al. 94 On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial judge had
discretion in a civil case to allow jurors to take notes during the trial and to use
their notes during deliberations.95 Nevertheless, it affirmed the grant of the
new trial, because it was also within the discretion of the trial judge to not
allow jurors to use their notes during deliberations. 96
Pine Island RV Resort, Inc. v. Resort Management, Inc.1"' dealt with the
use of written, rather than oral, jury instructions. Because neither party objected
to the use of written instructions when they were given to the jury, the Supreme
Court's review was limited to fundamental error.'98 Although 'the Oklahoma
Supreme Court noted its disapproval of the judge's giving the jury written
instructions without reading them in open court, it held that no fundamental
error occurred, because there was no statutory mandate that the judge must
instruct the jury orally."9
In Shaffer v. Jeffery," the Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented with
the question whether the trial court or the arbitrators should determine if a
contract containing an arbitration clause was induced by fraud."°  The plain-
189. See id. at 294.
190. See id.
191. 916 P.2d 1383 (Okla. 1996).
192. See id. at 1384.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 1387. In contrast, the Court of Criminal Appeals has determined jurors in a criminal case
may not use notes during their deliberations. See White v. State, 552 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Okla. Crim. App.
1976); Glazier v. State, 514 P.2d 87, 91 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
196. See Sligar, 916 P.2d at 1388.
197. 922 P.2d 609 (Okla. 1996).
198. See id. at 612-13; cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2104 (1991).
199. See Pine Island, 922 P.2d at 612-13. In contrast, oral instructions are mandated by statute in criminal
cases. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 831(5) (1991).
200. 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996).
201. For an excellent discussion of the Shaffer case, as well as Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, 910
P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996), in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of arbitration
agreements, see Patricia Ledvina Himes, New Oklahoma Supreme Court Decisions Regarding Arbitration-
Sustaining Constitutionality and Expanding the Role of District Courts, 67 OKLA. BJ. 2887 (1996). See also
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tiffs were six couples, each of which was seeking to adopt a child, who filed
suit against a lawyer and his former law firm alleging that the defendants had
developed a scheme to defraud them by collecting fees in return for false assur-
ances of prospective adoptions.' The trial court ordered arbitration pursuant
to a clause in the plaintiffs' attorney-client fee contracts.' On appeal, the
plaintiffs argued "that the fee [contracts] containing the arbitration clause were
induced by fraud." The Oklahoma Supreme Court first decided that an arbi-
tration agreement was voidable under Oklahoma's Uniform Arbitration Acte °'
if either the arbitration clause itself or the contract containing the arbitration
clause was induced by fraud.' That left the question whether the issue of
fraud in the inducement should be decided by the trial court or the arbitrators.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that under the separability doctrine, which
had been adopted by the United States Supreme Court' and followed in most
other states, the issue of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself
was for the trial court, while the issue of fraud in the inducement of the con-
tract containing the arbitration clause was for the arbitrators.' The Oklahoma
Supreme Court rejected the separability doctrine, however, for the reason that
the trial court is better suited to resolve the issue of fraud than the arbitra-
tors.' Accordingly, it held that the trial court must determine whether there
was fraud in the inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause be-
fore ordering arbitration.2 0
B. Settlement and Judgments
The major developments in the area of judgments and settlement were
several Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions '1 involving the effect of releases
on subsequent litigation with other tortfeasors, which followed its 1995 decision
in Moss v. City of Oklahoma City.21 There were also three cases2"3 dealing
with whether satisfaction of a judgment moots an appeal or motion to vacate
Gregory RJ. Zini, Comment, The Arbitration Clause Controversy in Oklahoma, 32 TULSA W. 163 (1996)
(discussing Rollings and other arbitration cases).
202. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 912.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 912.
205. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 802(A) (1991).
206. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915.
207. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
208. See id. at 403-04.
209. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917.
210. See id.
211. See Hoyt v. Paul R. Miller, M.D., Inc., 921 P.2d 350 (Okla. 1996); Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp.,
920 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1996); Shadden v. Valley View Hosp., 915 P.2d 364 (Okla. 1996); Carmichael v. Belier,
914 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1996); Cotner v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 903 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1995).
212. 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995).
213. See McMillian v. Holcomb, 907 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1995); Stites v. DUIT Constr. Co., 903 P.2d 293
(Okla. 1995); American Medical Int'l v. Feigel, 918 P.2d 752 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
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the judgment. In addition, two cases214 were concerned with the vacation of
judgments.
In Moss v. City of Oklahoma City,2"' the Supreme Court construed the
following language in the Oklahoma version of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act"216 "When a release.., is given in good faith to one
of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury..... [i]t does not dis-
charge any of the other tort-feasors from liability... unless its terms so pro-
vide .... .2 " Based on this language, the Supreme Court held that a general
release would discharge potential tortfeasors who were not parties to the release
from liability only if they were expressly designated or otherwise specifically
identified in the release.2 8 The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly overruled
its prior decision in Brown v. Brown1 9 which had been decided before the
adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and rejected a
Tenth Circuit opinion that had followed Brown. After Moss was decided,
the last clause in section 832(H)(l) that is quoted above was changed from
"unless its terms so provide" to "unless the other tort-feasor is specifically
named." 1
During the past year, the Supreme Court applied the Moss holding and the
1995 amendment to section 832(H)(1) in five decisions, which like Moss were
authored by Justice Lavender. Moss was followed in Cotner v. Cessna Aircraft
Co.,' another case involving a general release that purported to release un-
named tortfeasors from liability. Carmichael v. Beller and Shadden v. Val-
ley View Hospital 4 involved similar factual situations and resulted in strik-
ingly similar opinions. Both arose out of cases in which the plaintiffs sued both
their original tortfeasors and the medical personnel that treated them.' After
the plaintiffs settled with the original tortfeasors, the defendant medical per-
sonnel obtained summary judgments based on the general releases given to the
original tortfeasors. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in both cases that to
the extent that the original tortfeasors and the defendant medical personnel
shared common liability, the general release was insufficient to release the
medical personnel under Moss, because they were not specifically named in the
release.m The same result would obtain to the extent that the original
tortfeasors and the defendant medical personnel did not share common liabili-
214. See FDIC v. Jernigan, 901 P.2d 793 (Okla. 1995); Campbell v. Pharr, 916 P.2d 266 (Okla. Ct. App.
1995).
215. 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995).
216. OKLA. STAT. fit. 12, § 832 (1991) (amended 1995).
217. Id. § 832(H).
218. See Moss, 897 P.2d at 284, 286.
219. 410 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1966).
220. See Mussett v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 844 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1988).
221. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 832(H) (1991 & Supp. 1996).
222. 903 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1995).
223. 914 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1996).
224. 915 P.2d 364 (Okla. 1996).
225. See Carmichael, 914 P.2d at 1054; Shadden, 915 P.2d at 366.
226. See Carmichael, 914 P.2d at 1054-55; Shadden, 915 P.2d at 367.
227. See Moss v. City of Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280,288-89 (Okla. 1995).
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ty." Moss was extended in Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 9 to the entry
and satisfaction of an agreed or consent judgment based on a compromise or
settlement. In such a case, it is important to determine whether the settlement
was intended to represent full compensation for all the plaintiff's injuries
(which would bar a subsequent suit against other tortfeasors), or the settlement
was not intended to discharge other tortfeasors.' ° The Kirkpatrick holding
was applied in Hoyt v. Paul R. Miller, M.D., Inc."' to a release and satisfac-
tion of judgment filed in a previous case.
The effect of satisfaction of a judgment on an appeal or motion to vacate
the judgment was the subject of several decisions. 2 The general rule in Okla-
homa is that a voluntarily satisfied judgment moots a challenge to the judgment
either by appeal or a motion to vacate.z3 In contrast, an appeal or a motion to
vacate a judgment is not mooted by a coerced or involuntary satisfaction of the
judgment. 4 Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in Stites v. DUIT Con-
struction Co." that the collection of a judgment against a defendant through
garnishment did not bar the defendant from having the judgment vacated and
the garnished funds returned." In contrast, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
ruled in American Medical International, Inc. v. Feigel,"7 that absent fraud, a
defendant who had voluntarily satisfied a judgment could not vacate or modify
the judgment."
McMillian v. Holcomb9' was a closer case which highlights the need for
care in the handling of payments received while a case is still pending either in
the trial court or on appeal. In McMillian, a landowner received and cashed a
check representing an award for condemnation of the landowner's property, and
the condemnor moved to dismiss the landowner's appeal on account of the
landowner's acceptance of the award.' The Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that the landowner's acceptance of the condemnation award did not require
dismissal of the appeal because the landowner did not apply for payment and,
although the check was cashed, the funds remained in the trust account of coun-
sel for the landowner.24
228. See Carmichael, 914 P.2d at 1059; Shadden, 915 P.2d at 371.
229. 920 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1996).
230. See id. at 133.
231. 921 P.2d 350 (Okla. 1996).
232. See McMillian v. Holcomb, 907 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1995); Stites v. DUFF Constr. Co., 903 P.2d 293
(Okla. 1995); American Medical Int'l v. Feigel, 918 P.2d 752 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
233. See Stites, 903 P.2d at 299; American Medical Int'l v. Feigel, 918 P.2d 752, 754 (Okla. Ct. App.
1996) (following Stites).
234. See Stites, 903 P.2d at 299.
235. 903 P.2d 293 (Okla. 1995).
236. See id. at 299-301.
237. 918 P.2d 752 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
238. See id. at 754.
239. 907 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1995).
240. See id. at 1037.
241. See id. at 1038-39.
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In a case of first impression, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held in
Campbell v. Pharri2 that a trial court had discretion under the term-time pro-
vision in section 1031.1 of title 12243 to vacate a mandatory dismissal of a
case. The mandatory dismissal was granted under Rule 9(b) of the Rules for
District Courts of Oklahoma2" and section 1083 of title 12,245 which provide
for mandatory dismissal for failure to prosecute an action.' The trial court
dismissed the case because the plaintiff's counsel failed to appear at a
dispositional hearing, but it vacated the dismissal when it was shown that the
reason the plaintiff's counsel did not appear at the hearing was that he had
chicken pox.247
The Oklahoma Supreme Court drew an important distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud in FDIC v. Jernigan.2" Intrinsic fraud covers
fraud that is perpetrated in the course of an adversarial proceeding, such as the
presentation of false evidence or the making of false statements to the court2 9
In contrast, extrinsic fraud consists of fraud perpetrated outside of an ad-
versarial proceeding that prevents a party from fully and fairly presenting his
side of the case."0 The Supreme Court ruled in Jernigan that relief from a
judgment on grounds of intrinsic fraud can only be sought through vacation of
the judgment under section 1031(4) of title 12.2" The time limit for seeking
relief under section 1031(4) is two years from the date of the judgment2 In
contrast, relief from a judgment on grounds of extrinsic fraud may be sought
either through vacation of the judgment in the original action or through a
separate action, and the time limit for bringing a separate action is two years
from discovery of the fraud. 3 The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the motion to vacate because the defendant was
unable to show extrinsic fraud and his motion to vacate was filed more than
two years after the filing of the judgment.5 4
The final section of this article discusses recent developments in Oklahoma
appellate procedure. Foremost among the developments was the adoption of the
new Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules. 5 There were also important decisions
dealing with the appealability of judgments and orders and two decisions 56
242. 916 P.2d 266 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
243. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1031.1 (Supp. 1996).
244. OKLA. DIST. Cr. R. 9(b), OKLA. STAT. fit. 12, ch. 2, app. (1991).
245. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1083 (1991).
246. See Campbell, 916 P.2d at 267.
247. See id.
248. 901 P.2d 793 (Okla. 1995).
249. See id. at 797.
250. See id. at 798.
251. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1031(4) (1991).
252. See id. § 1038.
253. See id. § 95(3).
254. See Jernigan, 901 P.2d at 798.
255. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 1 (West 1997 Special Pamphlet).
256. See Joiner v. Brown, 925 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1996); Bushert v. Hughes, 912 P.2d 334 (Okla. 1996).
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that highlighted an omission in the Oklahoma Statutes concerning the giving of
notice of the filing of a judgment.'
IV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. The New Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has promulgated a new set of Oklahoma
Supreme Court Rules, 8 which has superseded three sets of prior Rules: the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 9 the Rules of Appellate Procedure
in Civil Cases,' and the Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Ap-
peals."' All the Rules that govern Oklahoma civil appellate procedure have
been consolidated into one set, and the Rules have been reorganized so that it is
easier to locate the pertinent ones. The adoption of a new set of Rules was long
needed, because the prior Rules did not reflect the numerous amendments that
had been made to the Oklahoma Statutes that control Oklahoma appellate pro-
cedure. 2 The new set of Rules also includes an Appendix that conveniently
collects a number of forms for use in connection with appeals. 3
The major substantive changes made by the new Rules are in the provi-
sions for designation of the record on appeal. Rule 1.28(b)2" provides ex-
pressly that a designation of record that includes the entire trial court record is
not permitted, except if authorized by the Chief Justice. In addition, the Rule
lists a number of items which should not be included in the record, such as
depositions that have not been admitted into evidence, documents pertaining to
service, and procedural motions and orders, unless they are specifically drawn
in issue on the appeal.' Thus, the Supreme Court is expressly discouraging
voluminous designations of record.
B. Appealability of Judgments and Orders
Several recent cases were concerned with the appealability of various trial
court orders. The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided in Gilliland v. Chronic
Pain Associates' that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing
the parties to proceed to arbitration before a different panel was appealable as a
final order under section 953 of title 12,267 because it prevented the award
257. Cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2 (Supp. 1996).
258. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. I (West 1997 Special Pamphlet). For a detailed analysis of
the changes made by the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, see Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., The New Oklahoma Su.
preme Court Rules, 67 OKLA. BJ. 3991 (1996).
259. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 1 (Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
260. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2 (Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
261. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 3 (Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
262. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 900.2-995 (Supp. 1996).
263. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 1, R. 1.300-1.301 (West 1997 Special Pamphlet).
264. See id. R. 1.28(b).
265. See id.
266. 904 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1995).
267. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 953 (1991).
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from being confirmed by a judgment.' Similarly, the Supreme Court ruled in
Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hospital Founders Ass'n 9 that an order setting the
amount of sanctions imposed on an attorney under section 2011 of title 12 '
was appealable as a final order under section 953 of title 12,"' because it was
an "end-of-the-line disposition" of the only issue involving the attorney, who
was not a party to the underlying case.' The Supreme Court added in
dictum that if sanctions had been imposed against a party, the sanctions
order would have been appealable as an interlocutory order for the payment of
money pendente lite under section 993(A)(5) of title 12"
The Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the use of certified interlocutory
appeals under section 952(b)(3) of title 12'~ in Roach v. Jimmy D. Enterpris-
es, Ltd.276 A major limitation on the use of certified interlocutory appeals is
that the appeal must affect "a substantial part of the merits of the controver-
sy." 7 Although this language had been interpreted to exclude issues involv-
ing practice, procedure, and evidence, the Supreme Court held in Roach that a
certified interlocutory appeal was appropriate for the determination of whether
punitive damages were recoverable in an action for the wrongful death of a
child, because this affected "a substantial part of the merits of the controver-
sy. '7 8
In order for a judgment to be appealable it must resolve all the issues and
claims in the case.279 The Oklahoma appellate courts continue to receive ap-
peals from trial court decisions that have not resolved all issues and claims, and
these appeals are consistently dismissed as premature. For example, in LCR,
Inc. v. Linwood Properties"° the Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed an ap-
peal from a trial court decision in an action to foreclose a second mortgage,
because the trial court did not decide the priority rights of the first mortgage
holder, the amount of the mortgagor's liability on the underlying notes, and the
amount of attorney fees due to the plaintiff." The Oklahoma Supreme Court
also dismissed the appeal in Liberty Bank & Trust Co. v. Rogalin,'2 another
mortgage foreclosure case. Although the trial court decision determined the
amount owed and ordered the mortgage foreclosed and the property sold, the
court expressly reserved its decision on the mortgagor's counterclaim. 3 The
268. See Gilliland, 904 P.2d at 77.
269. 917 P.2d 6 (Okla. 1996).
270. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (1991).
271. Id. § 953.
272. See Hammonds, 917 P.2d at 7.
273. See id. at 7-8 n.6.
274. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 993(A)(5) (1991).
275. Id. § 952(b)(3).
276. 912 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1996).
277. OKLA. STAr. tit. 12, § 952(b)(3) (1991).
278. See Roach, 912 P.2d at 855.
279. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 994 (Supp. 1996).
280. 918 P.2d 1388 (Okla. 1996).
281. See id. at 1392 n.12.
282. 912 P.2d 836 (Okla. 1996).
283. See id. at 837.
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appeal was therefore premature under section 994 of title 12.' Another ap-
peal was dismissed on account of section 994 in Shackelford v. American Air-
lines, Inc.' Although the trial court certified its order granting summary
judgment on a third party indemnity claim under section 994, the Court of
Appeals refused to accept the certification and ruled that the order lacked fmnali-
ty." The trial court's decision determined that the third party defendant was
liable on the indemnity claim, but it did not determine the amount of damages,
and it also failed to address another third party claim based on breach of con-
tract.W
C. Notice of the Filing of Judgments
In two recent decisions, 8 the Oklahoma Supreme Court has struggled
with a shortcoming in the Judgments Ace 9 relating to the giving of notice to
an appellant of the filing of a judgment. The date of the filing of a judgment is
critical under section 990A of title 12,290 because the thirty day limit on the
time to appeal begins to run from this date. Section 696.2(B)29 states that the
court shall cause file-stamped copies of the judgment to be mailed to all parties
who have appeared in the action if the judgment was taken under advisement,
but it does not require the giving of notice of the filing of the judgment in other
cases.2u
In Bushert v. Hughes,29 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an ap-
peal was untimely,.94 because it was filed more than thirty days after the filing
of a judgment taken under advisement, even though the appellant did not re-
ceive notice of the filing of the judgment until after the time to appeal had
run.29 The Supreme Court reasoned that by approving the form of the judg-
ment, the appellant became obliged to monitor the court clerk's office to deter-
mine when the judgment was filed.' The Supreme Court gave its decision
only prospective effect, however, and did not dismiss the appeal.'9
In contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Joiner v. Brown29 that
an appeal filed more than thirty days after the filing of an order of dismissal
was not untimely even though the judgment was not taken under advisement
and the appellant received notice of the filing of the judgment before the dead-
284. See id. at 839.
285. 916 P.2d 282 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
286. See id. at 285.
287. See id. at 284-85.
288. See Joiner v. Brown, 925 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1996); Bushert v. Hughes, 912 P.2d 334 (Okla. 1996).
289. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 990.2-995 (Supp. 1996).
290. Id. § 990A.
291. Id. § 696.2(B).
292. See id.
293. 912 P.2d 334 (Okla. 1996).
294. See id. at 340-41.
295. See id. at 335-36.
296. See id. at 338.
297. See id. at 335.
298. 925 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1996).
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line for filing an appeal had expired.2' The Supreme Court ruled that it was
unconscionable for the prevailing party's counsel not to honor opposing
counsel's request for a file-stamped copy of the dismissal order?' ° It also held
that the court clerk had a responsibility to mail file-stamped copies of all judg-
ments and appealable orders to all parties whose names and addresses are listed
on the journal entry when it is filed."1
Bushert and Joiner appear inconsistent, because Bushert requires counsel
who approves a judgment or appealable order for filing to monitor the court
clerk's office to determine when it is actually filed, while Joiner permits coun-
sel to rely on the court clerk to mail a copy of the order to all counsel of re-
cord. The root of the problem, though, is the lack of a procedure in the govern-
ing statutes for the giving of notice to the parties of the date of filing of a judg-
ment.
The Civil Procedure Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association proposed
an amendment' to section 696.2(B)' that went into effect on May 1,
1997. The amendment requires the party who prepares a judgment, or another
person designated by the court, to mail a file-stamped copy of the judgment to
all other parties no later than three days after it is filed.3 " This removes the
burden of giving notice of the filing of the judgment from the court clerk in
most cases. Amendments to other provisions in the Judgments Act that deal
with the timing of appeals and post-trial motions extend the time for filing
appeals and post-trials until after the mailing of a file-stamped copy of the
judgment, if the court records do not reflect the mailing of notice within three
days after the filing of the judgment." s These amendments give the party
seeking to uphold a judgment an incentive to give notice of its filing to other
parties, and also assure that a party will not lose the opportunity to file an ap-
peal or post-trial motion without having been given notice of the filing of the
judgment.
299. See id. at 889.
300. See id. at 890.
301. See id.
302. H. 1778, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1997) (enacted).
303. OKLA. STAT. fit. 12, § 696.2(B) (Supp. 1996).
304. See Okla. H. 1778; see also OBA Resolutions for 1997 OBA Legislative Program, 67 OKLA. BJ.
3107, 3109 (1996).
305. See OBA Resolutions, supra note 304, at 3108-14.
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